Public debt, North and South by Reisen, Helmut
Policy,  Planning,  and Research
WORKING  PAPERS
Debt  and  International  Finance
International  Economics  Department




North  and South
Helmut  Reisen
Why has government debt risen since 1984  despite rationed for-
eign lending and efforts at  fiscal consolidation? And how can the
rising debt be stopped? Possible remedies are growth-oriented
fiscal adjustment, improved debt management, and voluntary
debt reduction.
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Debt  and International  Finance
The recent rise in domestic public nonmonetary  of GDP, both explained largely by depressed
debt and in domestic bond yields is imposing a  savings and investment.
heavier burden on governments in countries like
Brazil and Mexico than foreign debt does.  This  *  Massive devaluation of the real exchange
is a relatively new experience for developing  nrte and big swings in value among key curren-
countries but not for OECD countries.  cies.
Reisen's discussion of rising government  How can the rise in government debt be
indebtedness, therefore, includes the experiences  stopped in the long run? Not through a burst of
of four developing (Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and  inflation, even when i; -s largely unanticipated
Indonesia) and three highly indebted OECD  - because tiie demand for base money is now
countries (Belgium, Ireland, and Italy).  (Neither  too small relative to public domestic debt. Nor
are the former four, especially Korea and  through domestic and foreign default - unless
Indonesia).  the government runs a substantial primary
surplus (which is mostly not the case) and can
Why, Reisen asks, has government debt  credibly commit to not defaulting again (which
been rising since 1984 despite rationed foreign  is unlikely).
lending and efforts at fiscal consolidation? He
finds the major determinants of debt to be:  Possible remedies, Reisen sugge  ., are
growth-oriented fiscal adjustment, improved
X Extemal transfers, which imply an internal  debt management, and voluntary debt reduction.
transfer of resources from the private to the  He calculates the noninterest surplus govem-
public sector.  ments would have to run to stabilize (and then
rcduce) public debt ratios and make their budg-
* Fiscal rigidities, because of failure to  ets consistent with other macroeconomic targets.
broaden tax bases and cut government consump-  He also discusses how fiscal adjustment can
tion.  foster growth at the same time that it minimizes
real depreciation of the exchange rate and
* High interest rates coupled with low growth  reduces the cost of domestic public debt.
This paper, prepared for the conference "Dealing with the Debt Crisis," is a product
of the Debt and International Finance Division,  Intemational Economics Department
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Tables  2  4A cross-country  study  on  developing  country  problems  usually  compares
the  Good,  the  Bad,  and  the  Ugly  within  the  Third  World. This  paper  will
include  Belgium,  Ireland  and  Italy  to  discuss  some  relevant  aspects  of  public
developing  country  debt. These  three  countries  belong  to  the  front  league  of
high-debt  OECD  countries,  and  their  public  debt  relative  to  GDP  is
considerably  higher  than  the  corresponding  ratio  of  the  prominent  LDC
debtors.  Yet  for  these  developed  countries,  a  perception  of  insolvency  has
not  developed.  It  may  be  useful  to  include  them  in  the  sample  because
economic  theory  provides  little,  if  any,  guidance  on  whether  there  is  solvency
or  a critical  debt  ratio.  A further  reason  to  have  a  side-look  at  high-debt
OECD  countries  is  their  ldrgely  unrepressed  financial  setting.  This  may  allow
some  conclusions  about  likely  feedback  of  economic  liberalisation  as  well  as
some  insights  into  debt  management.  Last  but  not  least,  the  recent  rise  in
domestic  public  non-monetary  debt  and  in  domestic  bond  yields  in  countries
such  as  Brazil  and  Mexico  is  imposing  a  heavier  interest  burden  on  the
affected  government  ;han  foreign  debt. This  is  a  relatively  new  experience
for  developing  countries,  but  not,  however,  for  OECD  countries.
The  sample  will  be  completed  by  Brazil,  Mexico,  Indonesia  and  Korea,
four  major  clients  of  the  World  Bank  with  very  different  characteristics,  in
order  to  try  to  answer  three  questions.  First,  what  explains  rising
government  debt  in  spite  of  rationed  foreign  lending  and  efforts  at  fiscal
consolidation  (the  external  and  internal  transfer  problem;  the  political
economy  of  taxes,  non-interest  spending,  and  inflation;  interest  rates  and
growth;  devaluation  and  cross-currency  movements)?  Second,  how  can  the  rise
in  government  debt  almost  certainly  nDQt  be  stopped  in  the  longer  run
(hyperinflation;  foreign  and  domestic  default)?  And,  third,  what  are  the
possible  remedies  (growth-oriented  fiscal  adjustment;  improved  debt
management;  voluntary  debt  reduction)?
I.  Hhy  government  debt  is  still  rising
Because  of  differences  in  the  definition  of  the  public  sector,
international  comparisons  of  peolic  debt  ratios  are  very  precarious.  Less
arbitrary  is  a  comparison  of  changes  in  debt  ratios.  Table  I  demonstrates  for
the  1980s  the  sharp  rise  in  government  debt  as  a  fraction  of  GDP  in  all
countries  except  Korea. Except  for  Indonesia,  where  domestic  debt  is  nil,  and
-1-Italy.  which  has  almost  no  foreign  debt  at  all,  the  structure  of  public  debt
is  now  more  similar  for  countries  like  Brazil,  Mexico,  Belgium  and  Ireland.
The  picture  is  puzzling  at  first  sight:  we  observe  the  highest  debt  ratio  in
Belgium  and  Ireland,  where  there  is  no  "debt  crisis".  In  Brazil,  Mexico,  and
Indonesia,  the  reduction  in  foreign  borrowing  has  gone  along  with  a rapidly
rising  foreign  debt  ratio.  External  transfers  have  done  nothing  to  reduce
government  indebtedness  when  they  were  pnr3maturely  imposed  from  abroad.
(Table  1)
1.  External  Transfers  and  the  Government  Pudast
The  link  between  the  external  transfer  of  foreign  exchange  from  debtor
countries'  governments  to  foreign  creditors  and  the  internal  transfer  of
resources  from  the  private  to  the  public  sectors  is  now  well  understood
(Reisen,  van  Trotsenburg,  1988;  Reisen,  1989).  A  regrouping  of  the  government
budget  identity,  which  usually  shows  the  link  between  the  public  borrowing
requirement  (fiscal  deficit)  and  external  and  internal  sources  of  finance.
makes  the  interaction  of  external  and  internal  transfers  immediately  apparent.
. p
(r*b-b*)e  - (t-g)  * (tg*-)e  - rb  *  AOP  *  b  (1)
Equation  (1)  links  the  external  public  transfer  - the  difference
between  interest  payments,  r*,  on  net  foreign  public  debt  (gross  debt  minus
foreign  exchange  reserves),  b, and  new  net  foreign  lending,  b^,  to  the
domestic  sources  of  financing.  The  latter  are  tax  revenues,  t  and  t-,  the
reduction  of  non-interest  public  outlays,  g  and  g9,  and  of  interest  payments
on  domestic  public  debt.  rb,  the  increase  in  real  base  money,  M/P,  and  net  new
domestic  non-monetary  domestic  public  debt. Asterisks  denote  the  variables
which  depend  o..  international  prices  and  e,  the  debt-weighted  real  exchange
rate,  converts  them  into  local  currency.  All  variables  are  adjusted  for
domestic  inflation.  If  the  budget  identity  as  defined  above  captures  the
-2-entire  public  sector,  incorporating  all  government  levels.  public  enterprises,
extra-budgetary  funds.  and  the  central  bank.  then  it  adequately  measures  the
government's  claim  on  real  private  resources.  One  instrument  to  obtain  these
funds  is  yet  higher  (domestic)  government  debt. But  a  closer  look  on  debt
determinants  will  reveal  that  external  transfers  do  not  account  for  all,  and
need  not  account  for  any  of  the  rise  in  government  indebtedness.
2.  Debt  Dynamica
To  identify  exactly  where  the  debt  problem  lies,  equation  (1)  has  to  be
transformed  into  a debt-dynamics  equation:
xt  a  Xt- [(l-f)r  + f(r*+e)_nl  (2)
- [t-g)  +  (t*-g*)e]-(p+n)m
where x  is  the  total  public  debt  ratio
f  is  the  percentage  share  of  foreign  debt  in  total  public  debt
m  is  the  growth  rate  of  GDP
p  is  the  inflation  rate
m 4s  the  ratio  of  base  money  to  GDP
and  where  the  other  variables  introduced  above  are  now  expressed  in
percentages  of  GDP.
(Table  2)
Table  2  helps  us  understand  why  the  debt/income  ratio  stopped  growing
in  Korea  and  rose  rapidly  elsewhere  during  the  past  five  years.  Korea  could
afford  a  primary  deficit  (albeit  a  moderate  one)  because  extraordinary  GOP
growth  powered  ahead  of  interest  rates.\  In  contrast,  Mexico  was  the  only
country  to  run  a  primary  surplus  (almost  4  Z  of  GDP),  but  this  did  not  offset
the  combined  impact  of  negative  growth,  high  interest  rates,  and  (summing  up
the  ups  and  downs  of  its  real  exchange  rate)  of  heavy  debt-weighted
-3-devaluation.  Next  to  primary  balances  and  the  difference  of  interest  rates
and  output  growth,  the  table  reveals  the  foreign  exchange  rate  as  an  important
debt  determinant.  It  has  two  components:  a  devaluation  of  the  local  currency
relative  to  the  dollar  to  improve  external  cormpetitiveness  (to  generate
external  transfers  or  to  cope  with  other  external  shocks),  and  movements  in
the  dollar  value  of  key  currencies  like  the  yen  or  the  deutschmark.  The
foreign  exchange  rate  was  of  outstanding  importance  in  Indonesia  where  most
public  debt  is  in  hard  currencies  such  as  the  yen,  and  where  all  public  debt
is  foreign.  Before  1984,  during  the  first  phase  of  the  debt  crisis  (when
rationed  lending  forced  the  debtor  countries  to  switch  their  trade  balances
from  deficit  to  surplus),  the  exchange  rate  also  had  a  major  impact  on  public
debt  ratios  in  virtually  all  problem  debtor  countries.  In  spite  of  high
inflation  in  Brazil  and  Mexico,  monetary  finance  did  not  help  to  transfer  more
real  resources  from  the  private  to  the  public  sectors  there  as  it  did  in  Italy
where  inflation  had  been  brought  back  to  a  one-digit  level.  High  inflation
taxes  were almost  outpaced  by  negative  seignorage  since  the  demand  for  real
base  money  fell  rapidly.
A closer  look  at  each  of  the  debt  determinants  given  in  Table  2  will
tell  us  more  about  their  nature  and  thus  will  help  us  form  some  ideas  about
future  debt  growth.
3.  Tax  Collection.  Non-Interest  Spendina.  and  Inflation
When  is  there  a  public  debt  problem?  The  intertemporal  budget
constraint  provides  no  satisfactory  answer  to  that  question  because  it  is
compatible  with  cases  of  an  ever  increasing  debt-income  ratio  and  because  it
spreads  over  an  infinite  horizon.  More  binding  is  Spaventa's  (19885  p.  16)
definition  of  feasibility:  "If  there  are  perceived  social  and  political
limits  to  the  government's  ability  to  reduce  expenditure  and  to  increase
taxztion  net  of  transfers,  ...  there  are  also  limits  to  the  level  of  the  debt
ratio  which  is  compatible  with  a  credible  commitment  on  the  part  of  the
government  to  meet  the  intertemporal  constraint".
Spaventa's  definition  conveys  the  central  message  of  why  public  debt
easily  turns  pathologic  in  many  developing  countries  and  why  it  does  so  less
easily  in  richer  countries.  Tax  ratios  of  developing  countries  tend  to  be
much  lower,  generally  less  than  half  of  the  average  tax  ratio  of  industrial
-4-countries.  There  have  been  rare  instan.ces  (Indonesia)  among  developing
countries  where  it  has  been  raised  in  tUe  medium  run  by  several  percentage
points  of  GDP.  as  has  happened  in  some  dcveloped  countries  such  as  Ireland  and
Italy  (see  Table  3).
(Table  3)
Why  has  there  been  so  little  tax  adjustment  in  problem  debtor
countries?  There  may  be  three  views  on  that  question.  First,  supply-siders
would  relate  disappointing  tax  collection  to  the  microeconomic  details  of  tax
structures,  in  particular  to  marginal  tax  rates  and  the  real  income  level  to
which  these  rates  apply  (Reynolds,  1985).  Table  4  takes  them  to  task. It
shows  for  personal  income  taxes  the  top  marginal  rates,  the  associated  taxable
income  threshold  (in  thousands  of  dollars),  the  ratio  of  this  income  to  per
capita  GDP  (as  a  proxy  for  bracket  creep),  and  the  fiscal  yield  of  personal
income  tax  as  a percentage  of  GOP. Table  4  may  tell  us  a  lot.  It  shows  that
tax  pressures  intensified  in  Brazil,  Belgium  and  Ireland,  but  did  not  raise
tax  revenue  in  Brazil.\  It  shows  that  personal  income  tax  is  an  important
source  of  revenue  in  OECD  countries,  but  that  it  is  negligible  in  the  South.
It  also  shows  that  reduction  of  top  rates  (Korea,  Indonesia)  and  of  bracket
creep  (Indonesia)  may  produce  more  tax  revenues,  albeit  the  increase  has  been
moderate.:  But  tthe  table  does  rni  explain  why  the  fiscal  yield  on  personal
income  tax  has  been  almost  nil  in  Argentina  and  Brazil.
(Table  4)
A second  view  holds  that  depressed  tax  revenues  have  in  part  been  the
immediate  consequence  of  the  debt  crisis  itself.  Lower  levels  of  consumption,
profits,  wages,  per  capita  incomes,  and  imports,  mostly  unavoidable  for
effectively  restraining  overall  demand,  also  meant  shrinking  tax  bases.
Moreover,  the  Tanzi  effect  --  important  losses  of  real  tax  revenues  associated
with  the  acceleration  of  inflation  - was  confirmed  in  problem  debtor
countries.  Since  progressive  income  taxes  represent  only  a small  share  of
total  tax  revenue  in  developing  countries,  fiscal  drag  is  insignificant.  A
-5-high  proportion  of  taxes  levied  with  specific  rates  and  the  long  lags  in
collection  lead  to  inflation-induced  losses  for  the  governments  (Tanzi,
1977).  But  automatic  (de-)stabilizers  do  not  tell  the  full  story.
Low  tax  ratios  combined  with  standard  tax  rates,  bracket  creeps  and  low
fiscal  yield  suggest  a  third  view: the  failure  to  broaden  the  tax  base  is
crucial  in  explaining  persistent  debt-servicing  problems  in  many  developing
debtor  countries.  Administrative  and  technical  bottlenecks  in  tax  assessment.
levying  and  collection  prevent  tax  revenues  from  rising,  and  powerful  interest
groups  have  often  prevented  a  reform  of  tax  legislation  aimed  at  abolishing
tax  holidays  and  exemptions.  This  became  particularly  apparent  in  Brazil  in
late  1987  when  the  Finance  Minister  resigned  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to
enforce  a tax  reform  aimed  at  enlarging  the  tax  base. The  architect  of
Mexico's  tax  reform,  Francisco  Gil  Diaz  (1987),  reports  that  "considerable
political  resistance"  has  frustrated  the  elimination  of  tax  shelters  for
truckers,  agriculture,  publishers  and  other  groups,  sectors  to  which  profits
are  easily  relocated.  In  Argentina,  the  cigarette  tax  alone  collects  25  per
cent  more  money  than  the  profits,  capital  and  net  asset  taxes  combined.  A
mere  4.8  per  cent  of  the  companies  figuring  on  the  gains  ta:.  roll  paid  any  tax
at  all  in  1986  (The  Review  of  the  River  Plate,  November  27,  1987).
Repeated  failures  of  stabilisati'=  attempts  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  as
well  as  interwar  evidence  from  Europe  s;ggest  that  you  cannot  expect  thorough
fiscal  reform  in  countries  which  Alesina  (1988)  defines  as  in  an  Ounstableu
political  situation.  \"In  an  'unstable'  political  situation,  distributive
disputes  over  which  taxes  to  increase  (or  which  type  of  transfers  to  reduce)
generate  fiscal  deadlocks  which  undermine  the  government's  ability  to  increase
explicite  tax  revenues.  This  situation  occurs  if  each  group  has  enough  power
to  'block'  explicit  taxes  on  itself  but  not  enough  political  influence  to
impose  explicit  taxes  on  others".  Th  s  situation  is  to  be  contrasted  with  a
"stable"  situation  where  one  political  side  controls  economic  policy  decisions
based  on  a solid  majority  (say,  Indonesia)  or  based  on  a  lack  of  polarisation
between  political  groups  (say,  Columbia)  and  is  thus  able  to  impose  the
burden  of  public  debt  on  groups  that  are  not  represented  in  the  government.
Alesina's  concept  goes  back  to  Keynes'  Tract  (1923)  which  was  concerned  with
the  distributional  effects  of  a  growing  stock  of  public  debt  --  the  domestic
transfer  from  those  who  pay  the  taxes  that  service  the  aebt  (workers,
entrepreneurs)  to  those  who  hold  the  debt  (rentiers).
-6-External  transfers  have  encouraged  growing  domestic  public  debt,  and
fiscal  deadlocks  have  forced  their  monetisation.  Inflation  is  the  residual
outcome.  It  had  already  been  observed  by  Clark  (1945)  that  in  several
European  countries  in  the  interwar  period,  there  seemed  to  be  a limit  to  the
tax  ratio. Every  time  this  limit  was  reached  (at  about  25  per  cent)  inflation
increased.  While  the  (mainly  wartime)  increase  of  tax  ratios  in  OECD
countries  since  then  has  made  Clark's  observation  obsolete  for  the  rich
countries,  it  seems  confirmed  again  in  some  Latin  American  countries  of  the
1980s.
(Table  5)
Table  5  demonstrates  that  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  the  political
situation  was  "unstable"  while  it  was  not  so  in  Chile,  Columbia,  Indonesia  and
Korea,  where  non-inflationary  fiscal  adjustment  could  be  observed.  Mexico  was
an  in-between  case. The  year  after  tax  ratios  peaked  in  Argentina  (1980,
1986)  Brazil  (1982)  and  Mexico  (1986).  again  at  about  the  level  observed
during  interwar  Europe  (25  0),  inflation  accelerated  by  50  % in  all  three
countries  and  doubled  two  years  after  the  tax  ratios  peaked.
But  as  was  already  shown  in  Table  2,  with  the  demand  for  base  money
falling,  there  were  limits  to  the  quantity  of  resources  that  governments  could
acquire  throug;i  the  inflation  tax.  'If  they  pushed  the  inflation  rate  beyond
those  limits,  they  ended  up  with  smaller  real  resources.  This  explains  why
currency  reform  in  Argentina.  Brazil  and  Bolivia  was  inevitable  and  also
explains  the  timing  of  those  reforms.  The  timing  of  reform  in  each  country
was  closely  related  to  reaching  (Brazil)  or  exceeding  the  maximum  yield  from
the  inflation  tax.
When  interest  rates  outpace  GDP  growth,  the  need  to  pay  growing
interest  outlays  impedes  cuts  in  overall  spending  (and  tax  burdens).  This
observation  is  widespread:  it  holds  for  the  OECD  on  average,  for  high-debt
OECD  countries  in  particular,  and  there  is  thus  little  reason  to  believe  why
that  should  be  different  for  developing  debtor  countries.  Table  6  reveals,
however,  that  cross-country  differences  are  important.  In  "unstable"  cases
like  Brazil  and  Italy,  cuts  in  current  outlays  such  as  subsidies  and  public
salaries  were  anything  but  existent  and  raised  by  4  percentage  points  of  GDP.
The  opposite  was  observed  in  Belgium  and  Korea  where  current  public  spending
-7-was  reduced  by  about  4  percentage  points  of  GDP.  as  well  as  in
Mexico  (2  1/2  OV. Even  if  cuts  in  non-interest  public  spending  were
important,  they  were  rarely  "growth-oriented",  since  they  often  concentrated
on  capital  expenditure.  To  the  extent  that  these  cuts  hit  infrastructure
capital  rather  than  "white  elephants",  they  lowered  the  productivity  of
complementary  private-sector  capital,  the  profitability  of  private  investment
and  future  output  growth.
(Table  6)
4.  Interest  Rates  and  GOP  Growth
Much  of  the  increase  in  public  debt  ratios  has  been  unrelated  to
deficits  in  the  government  budgets.  As  shown  in  Table  2,  the  difference  of
real  interest  rates  over  real  GDP  growth  accounts  for  one  third  in  the  lowest
case  (Italy)  and  two  thirds  in  the  highest  case  (Mexico)  of  the  relative  debt
increase  in  recent  years  (since  end-1983).  Thus,  for  a  country  like  Mexico,
you  can  easily  imagine  a  disaster  scenario  in  spite  of  its  primary  budget
surpluses:  debt  service  replaces  investment  and  hence  reduces  output  growth
and  the  tax  base;  this  process  feeds  cn  itself  until  no  resource  base  is  left
from  which  to  service  the  public  debt. It  is  thus  important  to  know  to  what
extent  public  finance  can  contribute  to  higher  growth  and  lower  interest
rates,  and  to  what  extent  it  cannot.
Pooled  time-series/cross  section  regression  estimates  reported  in  the
1988  OECO  Survey  of  Belgium  identify  the  budget  deficit/private  saving  ratio
as  a significant  determinant  of  real  bond  yields.  The  ratio  explains  a  third
of  the  increase  in  bond  yields  from  1979  to  1983  as  well  as  a  third  of  their
subsequent  decline.  A  further  third  is  explained  by  the  US  bond  yields,
indicating  that  their  determinants,  e.g.  the  US  deficit/savings  ratio,  are
important  concerns  for  the  OECD  at  large  and  all  the  more  so  for  developing
countries  where  the  foreign  share  in  public  '.bt  is  higher.
In  countries  such  as  Mexico,  however,  real  bond  yields  have  failed  to
decline  with  falling  operational  deficits  (which  corrects  for  the  inflation
component  in  the  government's  interest  outlays).  This  may  be  due  to  the  fact
-8-that  debt-income  ra'.ios  have  continued  to  rise  and  that  they  matter  for
interest  rates  more  t..  n  the  deficit  itself.  Apparently,  the  savers  have
taken  into  account  the  risks  of  imminent  default  and  inflation  by  requiring
correspondingly  higher  interest  rates  (in  domestic  government  debt.
High  inflation,  excessive  minimum  reserve  requirements  and  forced  sales
of  government  bonds  have  enlarged  the  wedge  between  the  interest  yield  for
domestic  savers  and  the  interest  costs  for  domestic  borrowers.  Returns  on
savinjs  are  often  too  low  to  mobilise  saving  for  capital  formation  while
credit  costs  are  too  high  to  1inance  even  profitable  investment.  The
concomitant  losses  of  efficiency  and  opportunities  for  growth  are  often
exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  rationed  credit  is  extended  to  favored  (big  or
public)  enterprises  at  preferential  interest  rates.
When  the  public  budget  deficit  exceeds  the  current  account  deficit,  the
public-sector  borrowing  requirement  has  to  be  matched  by  a  surplus  of
private-sector  savings  over  investment  (Table  7). Public  sectors  then  become
net  users  of  household  and  corporate  saving  which  are  then  unavailable  for
private  investment.  This  explains  why  investment  levels  are  so  depressed  in
many  problem  debtor  countries,  such  as  Mexico,  and  why  they  are  up  in  Korea
(in  spite  of  massive  external  transfers).
(Table  7)
Brazil  and  Italy's  experiences  reveal,  however,  that  the  negative.
output  effects  of  fiscal  deficits  can  be  offset  to  some  extent.  This  is  n2t
due  to  "tax  discounting",  certainly  not  in  the  countries  characterised  above
as  being  "unstable".  Taxpayers  do  nmt  increase  private  savings  to  prepare  for
future  taxes  that  governments  will  eventually  have  to  levy  to  pay  increased
interest  payments  on  their  debt. Why  should  they,  when  they  can  easily  evade
taxation?  Even  in  the  majority  of  OECD  countries,  the  tax-discounting  factor
appears  to  be  close  to  zero  (Nicholetti,  1988).  But  fiscal  deficits  can
displace  private  consumption  and  lure  savers  into  purchasing  public  debt  when
high  real  rates  of  return  are  offered  and  near  substitutes  of  treasury  bills
are  taxed  (Italy)  or  unhedged  against  high  inflation  (Brazil).
-9-For  the  output  effect  of  a  given  fiscal  deficit,  much  depends  on  the
(incentive)  structure  of  taxes  and  public  spending.  If  countries  such  as
Argentina  intensify  the  tax  pressure  on  traditionally  convenient  tax  handles
such  as  export  production,  agriculture,  and  domestic  financial  assets,  their
disappointing  performance  in  savings,  exports  and  output  growth  should  come  as
no  surprise  (Reisen  and  van  Trotsenburg,  1988).  Output  growth  depends  equally
upon  the  composition  of  government  expenditure.  But,  as  Buffie  and  Sanguines
Krause  (1989)  demonstrate  in  a  formal  model  applied  to  Mexico,  only  cuts  in
government  consum2tion  equal  to  the  debt  service  increases  succeed  in
maintaining  the  existing  growth  rate  without  intensifying  inflationary
pressures.  Cuts  in  public  infrastructure  capital  formation  instead  not  only
lower  the  nation's  overall  investment,  they  also  depress  the  profitability  of
private  investment  which  then  translates  into  lower  growth,  lower  savings  and
lower  taxes.
The  evidence  sketched  here  confirms  the  hypothesis  that  government
policies  in  general  and  the  public  budget  in  particular  do  matter  for  the
relationship  of  GDP  growth  and  -. nterest  rates.  But  much  depends  on  the  United
States  and  some  other  important  OECD  countries,  as  has  already  been  reported
for  the  impact  of  US  bond  yields  on  interest  rates  worldwide.  Apart  from
bargaining,  developing  debtor  countries  exert  no  influence  on  the  pure
interest  cost  of  their  foreign  debt.  Needless  to  say,  average  GDP  performance
in  developing  debtor  countries  depends  heavily  on  OECD  growth  and  OECD
macroeconomic  and  trade  policy.
S.  Real  Devaluation  and  Cross-Currency  Movements
While  the  reduction  of  domestic  public  debt  tends  to  reduce  interest
rates,  efforts  to  reduce  fore1in  debt  generally  call  for  a  real  devaluation  of
the  exchange  rate  below  purchasing  power  parity  to  generate  the  real  transfer
(trade  surplus)  for  foreign  debt  service.  The  size  of  the  shift  in  real
exchange  rates  that  is  called  for  becomes  very  large  when  external  borrowing
(putting  upward  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate)  and  subsequent  external
transfers  take  on  massive  proportions  and  are  squeezed  within  a short  period.
Real  effective  exchange  rates  (trade-weighted)  of  major  developing  debtor
countries  are  now  often  40  %  below  their  1980-82  average.  Add  to  this  the
`.N  important  swings  in  the  value  among  key  currencies  --  e.g.,  the  yen  has
-10-appreciated  nmore  than  100  X against  the  US  dollar  --  and  it  is  obvious  why
changes  in  the  foreign  exchange  rates  have  mattered  so  much  for  debt  dynamics.
Problem  debtor  countries  like  Brazil  and  Mexico  suffered  the  heaviest
capital  losses  due to  real  devaluation  during  1982/83 when their  foreign
public  debt  ratio  doubled.  Debt-weighted  real  annual  devaluation  also
accounted  for  much  of  the  rising  public  debt  ratios  during  1984-87.  For  the
latter  period,  it  explains  for  85 .of  the  rise  in  the  public  debt  ratio  in
Indonesia  which  engineered  massive  devaluations,  and  where  all  public  debt  is
foreign  and  most  of  that  debt  is  in  yen  and  other  low-coupon  currencies.
Debt-weighted  real  devaluation  accounts  for  27  X of  the  rise  in  the
debt-income  ratio  during  1984-87  in  Brazil  and  Mexico.
'  Devaluation  also  has  an immediate  impact  on  the  government  budget.  The
impact  is  likely  to  be  negative  in  the  typical  (largely  inward-oriented)
problem  debtor  country.  'The  rise  in  tax  receipts  and  new  inflow  of  foreign
finance  are  too  limited  to  make  up  for  the  rise  in  local-currency  costs  of
servicing  foreign  debt  following  a  devaluation.
While  the  immediate  consequence  of  a sustained  real  devaluation  is  a
proportionate  rise  in  the  real  interest  payments  on  foreign  debt.  its  impact
on  the  non-interest  part  of  the  government budget is  much more difficult  to
determine.  The budget  is  likely  to  be affected  by devaluation,  either  because
of  resultant  changes in  prices  (price  effect)  or  because of  changes in  various
tax  bases  induced  by  changes  in  wages,  corporate  income,  or  export  and  import
volumes  (output  effect).
A sustained  real  devaluation  raises,  by  definition,  the  prices  of
tradable  goods  relative  to  non-tradables.  To  analyse  the  price  effect,  it  is
therefore  useful  to  break  the  non-interest  budget  deficit  (or  surplus),.down
into  those  taxes  and  expenditures  that  depend  on  home  prices  and  those  that
depend  on  world  prices.  In  other  words,  the  governmnent  has  a  deficit  (or
surplus)  in  nontradables,  and  another  in  tradables  [see  equation  (1)].
For  example,  expenditure  on  nontradables  are  public  sector  salaries  and
on-tradables  imported  capital  goods,  while  tax  receipts  fall  on  nontradables
like  taxes  on  labour  and  on  tradables  like  trade  taxes.  A government  of  an
outward  oriented  economy  (such  as  Korea)  or  with  an  important  public  mineral
sector .such  as  Nigeria)  is  more  likely  to  profit  from  devaluation  than  a
government  of  an  inward  oriented  economy  without  export  oriented  public
enterprises  (Brazil,  for  example).  In  the  latter  type  of  country,  the  dollar
-11-value  of  tax  receipts  which  arises  to  a large  part  from  taxes  on  nontradables
will  tend  to  fall  while  the  reduced  dollar  value  of  spending  on  nontradables
does  not  fully  offset  the  losses  in  tax  receipts.
Without  exchange  rate  overshooting,  a real  devaluation  exerts  a
negative  price  effect  on  the  public  budget  when  the  real  interest  on  net
external  debt  plus  the  non-interest  budget  deficit  on  tradables  exceeds  new
net  external  debt  (for  a  formal  exposition.  see  Reisen,  1989).  To  put  it
differently,  a real  devaluation  is  likely  to  improve  the  fiscal  situation  only
when  the  public  budget  on  tradables  is  in  an  initial  surplus  or  when  the  net
foreign  exchange  flow  (new  debt  minus  interest)  to  the  government  is  positive.
It  has  been  argued  that  in  an  open  economy  context  real  interest  rates
on  domestic  debt  can  fall.  provided  the  exchange  rate  overshoots  (Ize  and
Ortiz,  1987).  If  the  exchange  rate  initially  depreciates,  expectations  of
future  appreciation  would  create  a  wedge  hetween  returns  in  domestic  -nd
foreign  currencies,  which  would  allow  for  debt  servicing  on  local  currency
debt  to  fall.  But  even  with  overshooting,  a  devaluation  will  exert  a  negative
fiscal  impact  when  the  foreign  currency  portion  of  public  debt  plus  the
initial  deficit  based  on  tradables  is  higher  than  the  savings  made  on  domestic
currency  debt.
A further  channel  through  which  exchange  rate  adjustment  may  worsen
fiscal  imbalances  is  associated  with  the  widespread  existence  of  multiple
exchange  rates.  They  have  an  implicit  tax-subsidy  structure  (Dornbusch,  1986)
which  may  finance  a part  of  the  government  budget.  With  multiple  rates,
imports  can  be  taxed  by  a  high  price  of  foreign  exchange,  and  likewise  exports
by  a low  exchange  rate  at  which  foreign  exchange  earnings  must  be
surrendered.  On  the  other  hand,  the  multiple  rate  system  may  also  be  utilised
by  the  government  to  subsidise  imports  or  exports  through  preferential  rates.
The  net  fiscal  revenue  from  the  multiple  rate  structure  depends  on  the  excess
of  proceeds  from  foreign  exchange  sales  over  the  revenue  from  purchases.
Devaluation  tends  to  reduce  the  differential  between  the  official  and
black  market  rates.  Devaluation  may  also  be  accompanied  by  a full  unification
of  multiple  rates.  It  has  been  shown  that  the  elimination  of  the  exchange
rate  differential  has  led  to  a sharp  drop  in  the  implicit  export  and  import
taxes  when  the  affected  government  had  been  a  net  seller  of  foreign  exchange
(Pinto,  1987). In  a  similar  way,  in  Mexico  financial  losses  associated  with
-12-exchange  rate-differentials  between  dollar  assets  and  debts  of  the
nationalised  banks  in  the  wake  of  devaluation  added  4  per  cent  of  GDP  to  the
consolidated  public  deficit  in  1982.
The  second  component  of  the  debt-weighted  exchange  rate  are  the  swings
in  the  value among  key  currencies,  like  the  dollar,  the  yen,  and  the  European
currencies.
When  these  swings  become  as  important  as  those  experienced  in  the
1980s.  the  currency  composition  of  foreign  debt  can  be  shown  to  dwarf
cross-currency  differences  in  interest  rates  as  a  determinant  for  foreign  debt
service  costs.  Changes  in  the  conversion  value  of  outstanding  debt  plus  the
interest  effect  of  these  changes  outweigh  the  pure  interest  effects  in  the
comparison  of  alternative  debt  portfolios  as  a function  of  a)  the  level  of
outstanding  debt;  b)  the  currency  structure  of  that  debt;  c)  the  variance  and
co-variance  of  key  exchange  rates  and  d)  the  differences  in  interest  rates
among  different  key  currencies.
Most  developing  nations  are  unhedged  against  the  risks  of  exchange  rate
changes  between  key  currencieT,.  They  may  face  institutional  barriers  or  too
high  transaction  costs  which  prevent  them  from  participating  actively  on  the
future  markets.  But  they  can  minimise  their  exchange  risk  exposure  by
matching  the  currency  mix  of  their  debt  with  the  currency  mix  of  their  cash
fl.ows.
N.The  World  Bank  is  now  the  biggest  net  lender  to  highly  indebted
countries,  but  its  currency  pool  seems  particularly  inadequate  for  almost  all
developing  countries  because  it  tends  to  increase  their  foreign  exchange  risk
exposure  for  the  benefit  of  a  very  questionable  reduction  in  the  pure  interest
cost  of  the  Bank's  lending.  The  World  Bank  shifts  exchange  rate  risks  to  the
debtor  countries  by  lending  the  proceeds  of  the  borrowings  in  the  same
currencies  in  which  they  were  borrowed  (Lonaeus,  1988).  Since  1980,  the
currencies  used  for  disbursements  are  pooled,  and  all  borrowers  owe  the  bank
the  currencies  in  the  pool  in  the  same  proportions.  Apparently  misguided  by
the  endeavour  to  reduce  the  average  interest  cost  of  borrowings,  the  Bank  has
even  used  currency  swaps  to  concentrate  its  currency  mix  even  more  in  "hard"
currency  than  before  swaps.
Calculations  for  Indonesia  show  that  if  it  had  matched  the  currency  mix
of its  foreign  debt  with  the  currency  structure  of  its  cash  flows,  it  would
not  only  have  minimised  the  foreign  exchange  risk  of  cross-currency
-13-fluctuations,  but  also  would  have  saved  around  10  billion  US  dollars  during
1985-88  against  its  actual  currency  composition.  On  the  other  hand,  had  the
Indonesian  government  followed  the  World  Bank's  debt  management  practices,  it
would  have  lost  about  6  billion  US  dollars  during  the  same  period  in
comparison  to  its  actual  debt  structure  (Reisen,  1988).
II.  How  the  rise  in  government  debt  cannot  be  stoRped
The  subsequent  discussion  brings  us  right  into  the  field  of  dynamic
consistency.  At  first  sight.  hyperinflation  and  unilateral  default  would  seem
appropriate  devices  to  do  away  with  government  debt. Recent  evidence  suggest
that  they  do  not  work. This  does  not  imply  that  unallied  monetary  restraint
would  help.
1.  Inflation  Blow-Out
An  unanticipated  burst  of  inflation  has  helped  Argentina  (1982)  and
Mexico  (1983)  reduce  part  of  domestic  public  debt  and  real  cost  of  debt
service.  Such  a  strategy  of  inflicting  "surprise"  capital  losses  on  domestic
bond  holders  has  become  increasingly  ineffective  as  a  means  to  alleviate  the
public  debt  burder..  First,  maturities  of  government  bonds  are  now  extremely
short-term.  In  Brazil,  90  X  of  the  government's  deficit  is  financed  in  the
overnight  market.  In  Mexico,  the  respective  maturities  are  down  to  four
weeks.  Moreover,  public  debt  in  problem  debtor  countries  is  often  contracted
on  a floating-rate  base  or  fully  indexed  to  price  inflation.
(Table  8)
-14-Second-  rapid  monetisation  of  government  debt  would  not  bring  much
anymore  because  most  problem  debtor  countries  are  by  now  extremely
demonetised.  Table  8  demonstrates  this  point.  The  money  base  is  now  about
2  X  of  GOP  in  Brazil  (down  from  3.5  X  in  1981),  and  4.5  X  of  GOP  in  Mexico
(down  from  15.9  X  in  1981).  A  policy  that  doubled  the  money  base  in  a week
(e.g.  through  open  market  purchases)  would  reduce  publicly-held  debt  by  a  mere
11  % in  both  Brazil  and  Mexico.  Note  that  the  respective  figures  are  even
lower  for  Belgium  and  not  significantly  higher  for  Ireland  and  Italy.
Consequ,ntly,  an  inflationary  erosion  of  domestic  public  debt  does  not  work
and  would  not  justify  the  subsequent  costs  of  inflation.
2.  Default
Outright  default,  be  it  on  foreign  or  on  domestic  debt,  cannot  prevent
further  growth  of  public  debt  unless  tax  revenues  exceed  non-interest
spending.  This  condition  seems  only  satisfied  in  Chile  and  Mexico.  In
addition.  default  is  likely  to  impose  heavy  financial  costs  on  the  government.
Brazil's  temporary  interest  moratorium  (from  February  1987  to
February  1988)  has  cost  the  country  from  between  710  million  US  dollars
(according  to  the  government;  see  NZZ  of  16.2.88)  and  1.5  billion  US  dollars
(according  to  some  Brazilian  economists;  see  International  Currency  Review,
Vol.  19.4).  These  figures  would  include  higher  spreads  on  short-term  trade
loans  (140  million);  the  transfer  of  official  reserves  to  the  BIS  to  avoid
seizure  (20  million);  delayed  restructuring  of  the  debt  so  that  Brazil  has  had
to  continue  paying  for  higher  interest  margins  over  a longer  period  of  time
(550  million);  support  for  foreign  affiliates  of  Brazilian  banks  which  had
been  excluded  from  interbank  business  (750  million);  and  substantial  private
capital  flight  as  a  result  of  reduced  confidence  surrounding  the  moratorium.
Domestic  default  may  generate  similar  problems.  According  to  a  fiscal
theory  of  private  portfolio  allocation  and  capital  flight  (Ize,  1987),  the
private  sector  keeps  at  home  the  part  of  its  financial  wealth  on  which  it
expects  the  government  to  honor  its  obligations  and  sequesters  the  rest
abroad.  Loss  of  reputation  due  to  domestic  default  would  thus  impede  domestic
government  finance  and  stimulate  capital  flight.  The  situation  may  develop  in
a  different  way,  however,  when  an  old  regime  collapses  and  the  new  regime  can
credibly  commit  not  to  default  again. This  may  apply  to  the  Philippines,  but
-15-such  cases  are  exceptional.  Another  difficulty  is  that  domestic  banks  are
often  very  important  (captive)  lenders  to  their  government.  Domestic  default
would  severly  deplete  their  capital  and  would  risk  to  drive  'hem  into
bankruptcy.  As  a  consequence,  the  government  would  be  compelled  to  provide
substantial  support  to  the  domestic  banking  system  in  order  to  avoid  economic
chaos,  or  otherwise  it  would  face  the  negative  consequences  for  domestic
output.
III.  Possible  remedies
1.  How  Much  Fiscal  Discipline  is  Needed?
How  much  fiscal  discipline  is  necessary  to  restore  a  government's
creditworthiness  and  credibility?  Because  of  changing  market  perceptions  and
unstable  lending  conventions.  this  question  cannot  be  answered.  A more  modest
approach  is  to  determine  the  required  government  budget  in  order  to  stabilize
debt  ratios  and  to  make  it  consistent  with  other  macroeconomic  targets.  This
has  been  a  concern  for  OECD  Economic  Surveys  (see,  in  particular,  OECD
Economic  Survey  of  Ireland,  1987)  and  the  World  Bank  (Anand  and
van  Wijnbergen,  1987)  alike.
Solving  the  debt-dynamics  equation  (2)  for  the  required  non-interest
surplus  to  get  the  debt/income  ratio  to  decline,  yields  the  stability  condition
t(t-g)  + (t*-g*)e]  >  x  t(l-f)r+f(r*+e)-n3  - (p+n)m  (3)
It  tells  us  that  more  fiscal  discipline  is  required  to  avoid  inflation
and  rising  debt  ratios  when  the  demand  for  base  money  is  low,  when  GOP  growth
is  low  relative  to  real  interest  rates,  when  public  debt  is  high"relative  to
GOP.  and  when  real  depreciation  raises  the  real  value  of  net  foreign  debt.
Only  when  real  GDP  growth  exceeds  real  interest  rates  and  accumulated  debt  is
low  relative  to  seignorage,  can  the  government  run  a  primary  deficit  without
rai4ing  the  debt  ratio.
Tables  9  and  10  (from  Reisen.  1989)  provide  detailed  calculations  for
the  required  non-interest  surplus  in  Brazil  and  Mexicz;  which  would  be
consistent  with  constant  debt  ratios,  low  inflation  (S  per  cent  per  year)  and
real  interest  rates  sufficiently  high  to  make  capital  flight  unprofitable.  In
-16-the  case  of  Brazil,  the  latter  requirement  would  appear  to  be  met  for  early
1986  when  real  after-tax  returns  on  treasury  bills  stood  at  14.5  per  cent  and
net  errors  and  omissions  in  the  balance  of  payments  were  balanced  (Cardoso  and
Fishlow,  1988). In  Mexico,  the  same  conditions  seem  to  have  applied  in  late
1986,  when  the  tax-free  real  return  on  treasury  bills  was  15.4  per  cent
(Dornbusch,  1988).  In  the  longer  term,  under  condition  of  sustained  fiscal
discipline,  real  domestic  interest  rates  would  probably  find  a lower
equilibrium  level,  as  there  would  be  less  need  to  crowd  out  the  private  demand
for  loanable  funds  and  because  new  government  debt  could  be  sold  at  a lower
risk  premium.  Finally,  we  require  an  assumption  about  the  ratio  of  base  money
to  GDP. The  remonetisation  of  the  Brazilian  economy  after  the  Cruzado  Plan
(when  inflation  was  zero)  brought  the  ratio  up  to  4.4  per  cent  (from  2.3  per
cent  in  1985).  For  Mexico,  the  1986  ratio  of  base  money  to  GDP  was  very  high,
at  15.9  per  cent  in  1981,  but  has  declined  continuously,  falling  to  4.2  per
cent  in  1987. In  the  absence  of  other  evidence,  it  is  assumed  that  with
inflation  at  five  per  cent  and  real  interest  rates  at  15.4  per  cent,  the
Mexican  ratio  of  base  money  to  GDP  would  have  been  12  per  cent.
(Table  9)
(Table  10)
Further  assumtions  are  that  the  external  positions  of  both  Brazil  and
Mexico  require  no  further  real  real  devaluations  of  their  currencies,  that  the
real  effective  foreign  interest  rate  is  7  per  cent,  and  that  the  real  GDP
growth  rates  are  sustained  at  5  per  cent  in  Brazil  and  4  per  cent  in  Mexico.
Note,  however,  that  the  public  debt  ratios  and  end-1987  which  underly
these  results  may  be  viewed  by  private  agents  as  being  too  high  to  inspire
confidence  in  public  finances,  in  which  case  the  required  fiscal  discipline
would  be  more  harsh.  Several  results  deserve  to  be  stressed:
First,  a  higher  non-interest  surplus  will  be  required  for  the  Mexican
than  for  the  Brazilian  government  if  domestic  debt  is  to  be  serviced  at  1986
-17-interest  rates,  a  further  increase  of  public  indebtedness  is  to  be  avoided,
and  inflation  is  to  be  constrained  at  5  per  cent  annually.  This  result  is
largely  --  but  not  exclusively  --  determined  by  the  currently  observed  public
debt  ratio,  which  is  approximately  equal  to  GDP  in  Mexico,  but  only  half  as
high  in  Brazil.  In  1988,  the  Mexican  authorities  seem  to  have  achieved  the
requ.ired  fiscal  adjustment.  while  the  fiscal  disequilibrium  in  Brazil  is
estimated  at  about  3  per  cent  of  GDP. While  the  Mexican  achievement  is  very
impressive,  it  is  too  focused  on  cuts  in  public  investment.
Second,  the  burden  of  the  domestic  public  debt  will  matter  more  than
the  burden  of  foreign  debt,  provided  that  further  devaluation-induced
increases  in  the  real  cost  of  servicing  foreign  debt  can  be  avoided  and  that
the  interest  cost  of  domestic  debt  continues  to  exceed  the  cost  of  foreign
debt.
Third,  bringing  down  inflation  from  current  levels  to  those  observed  in
stable  debtor  countries  would  yield  an  important  once-for-all  gain  in
seignorage.  especially  in  Mexico.  If  this  gain  is  used  to  amortize  part  of
the  high-cost  domestic  debt,  the  required  non-interest  budget  surplus  will  be
reduced.
Debt  dynamics  continue  to  impose  restrictive  fiscal  policies  on
high-debt  OECD  countries,  too  (OECD.  1989).  Calculations  on  debt  stability
requirements,  based  on  a  somewhat  simpler  procedure  than  that  described  for
Brazil  and  Mexico,  above,  show  that  Belgium,  Ireland  and  Italy  still  have  a
fiscal  disequilibrium  so  that  debt  ratios  are  currently  rising  rapidly.  The
current  public  borrowing  requirements  still  exceed  the  level  that  would
stabilize  debt  ratios.  by  3.5  % of  GDP  in  Belgium,  2.0  1 in  Ireland,  and  3.2  X
in  Italy  (OECD,  1989,  table  5.23).
2.  Growth-Oriented  Fiscal  Adjustment
If  the  medium-term  strategy  is  to  stabilize  (and  then  to  reduce)  the
public  debt  ratio,  just  to  run  a  certain  non-interest  surplus  will  not  be
enough.  For  such  a strategy  to  be  sustainable,  GDP  growth  will  have  to  be
fostered  and  real  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  as  well  as  a  rise  in  real
-18-interest  rates  will  have  to  be  minimised.  If  fiscal  adjustment  is  sought  at
the  cost  of  lower  output  growth,  it  is  more  likely  to  be  disrupted  and  less
likely  to  reduce  government  indebtedness  during  a longer  period.
How  can  public  finance  in  problem  debtor  countries  contribute  to
savings.  investment,  and  growth?  There  are  several  reasons  to  focus  more  on
increased  tax  collection  and  less  on  cuts  in  public  spending  than  is  usually
done. First,  spending  cuts  have  made  more  strides  than  increased  taxes  and
canrot  reasonably  be  expected  to  be  reduced  further,  with  the  notable
exception  of  Brazil  and  Argentina.  Second,  effectivE  tax  ratios  are
relatively  low  in  most  debtor  countries  and  there  seems  scope  for
non-distorting  ways  to  increase  it. Third,  low  effective  tax  rates  and  low
import  dependence  suggest  a  relatively  high  income  multiplier  for  government
expenditure;  spending  cuts  thus  have  a considerable  negative  short-run  effect
on  output.
The  menu  for  tax  reform  would  include  the  following  essentials  (World
Bank,  1988):  keep  marginal  tax  rates  low  to  strengthen  incentives  to  work  and
save,  but  raise  effective  average  tax  rates.  This  means: broaden  tax  bases
by  eliminating  exemptions  and  special  incentives.  Choose  a tax  that  is  simple
and  enforceable  with  little  administrative  costs  and  that  raises  substantial
revenues.  Such  a  tax  is  the  Value  Added  Tax. Successful  performers,  such  as
Korea,  Indonesia,  Chile,  and  Turkey,  all  have  buccessfully  implemented  the
Value  Added  Tax. But  there  is  also  room  to  increase  revenues  from  the
personal  income  tax,  especially  by  eliminating  loopholes  for  top  income
levels.  Raise  compliance  and  enforcement  through  low  tax  rates.  high
penalties  on  outright  avoidance  and  through  abolishing  discretionary  elements
in  tax  legislation.  Introduce  effective  witholding  schemes  on  wages,
dividends  and  interest  and  strengthen  tax  administration  to  cross-check
different  tax  sources.  Stop  taxing  exports  and  financial  savings.
With  raised  tax  revenues,  the  composition  of  public  spending  could  (and
should)  be  shifted  back  towards  investment,  away  from  consumption  without
reducing  its  real  level.  To  encourage  private  investment  and  to  limit
devaluation-induced  capital  losses  on  foreign  debt,  the  priority  for  public
spending  would  be  on  infrastructure,  like  ports  and  roads,  that  favour  foreign
trade.
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To  stabilize  total  public  debt  ratios,  easy  alternatives  to  fiscal
adjustment  do  not  exist. The  taxation  of  domestic  bond  returns  would  dampen
debt  dynamics  only  if  the  tax  did  not  raise  the  bond  yields  required  from  the
savers  (OECD  Survey  of  Ireland,  1988).  Under  this  unlikely  condition,
governments  cculd  increase  the  tax  base  by  the  amount  of  public  interest
outlays  on  domestic  debt. But  if  there  is  perfect  foresight  and  if  assets  are
perfect  substitutes,  taxing  interest  payments  has  no  effect  on  budget
deficits.  Changes  in  tax  rates  on  any  assets  bring  about  an  equal  change  in
their  equilibrium  returns  and  hence  leave  after-tax  yields  unaltered
(Giovanni,  1988).  Italy,  however,  may  have  succeeded  in  dampening  the  rise  in
bond  yields  with  a  total  tax  exemption  of  interest  on  public  securites,  allied
to  the  withholding  tax  on  near  substitutes  of  treasury  bills  like  bank
deposits  (Spaventa,  1988).  The  process  of  directing  savings  towards
government  debt  was  helped  by  initially  Lhgh  financial  savings  in  Italy  and
the  decline  in  the  relative  price  of  real  estate.
Export  credits  and  World  Bank  lending  are  and  will  be  the  major  source
of  foreign  finance  to  heavily  indebted  countries.  This will  increase  the
risk  exposure  of  debtor  countries  to  swings  among  the  dollar.  the  yen  and
other  key  currencies.  To  hedge  against  these  foreign  exchange  risks,
countries  should  borrow  in  currencies  in  which  they  run  a  trade  surplus
(Black.  1976).  This  reverses  the  typical  practice  of  trade  finance  and  is  not
consistent  with  the  World  Bank  currency  pool  either.  Rather  than  using
currency  swaps  to  undiversify  its  lending  into  hard  currency,  the  Bank  should
use  the  swaps  to  diversify  its  original  currency  structure  in  accordance  with
the  cash  flows  of  the  given  developing  country,  at  least  within  the  limits  set
by  the  Bank's  credit  status  on  world  financial  markets.
The  World  Bank's  new  debt  report  stresses  the  importance  of  voluntary
debt-reductions.  D'accord,  under  one  important  condition:  foreign  debt
reduction  has  to  go  along  with  the  reduction  of  total  government  debt. With
domestic  bond  yields  largely  exceeding  the  effective  cost  of  foreign  debt,  the
outcome  can  be  different.  Debt-equity  swaps,  for  example,  are  usually
financed  by  the  debtor  government  (or  the  central  bank). If  this  finance  does
not  come  from  printing  new  money,  and  if  the  swap  does  not  increase  tax
collections,  the  government  has  to  issue  new  domestic  debt. Reduced  foreign
-20-debt,  translated  into  local  currency  through  the  real  exchange  rate,  will  then
be  offset  by  increased  domestic  debt,  corrected  for  the  redemption  discount,
rd. Hence,  the  government  budget  is  likely  to  benefit  from  a  debt  equity  swap
only  if
r(l-rd)b  < rb*e.
With  domestic  bond  yields,  say,  15  Z higher  than  the  average  cost  on
foreign  debt,  and  with  the  assumption  that  real  devaluation  of  the
debt-weighted  exchange  rate  is  zero,  the  redemption  discount  has  to  exceed
13  . to  satisfy  the  condition.  When  there  is  real  appreciation,  as  occurred
last  year  in  Mexico,  the  redemption  discount  has  to  be  even  higher  to  leave
t..e  government  budget  improved.
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-23-Table  1
Net  Public  Debt,  1981  and  1987
as  percentages  of  GOP
Changes  Levels
1981-1986L/7  1986/87
Qomesti1cForeign  Total  Dpmestic  Foreign  Total
Brazil  12.2  12.1  24.3  20.5  26.1  46.6
Mexico  28.5  31.1  59.6  40.4  53.4  93.8
Indonesia  --  42.7  42.7  --  53.0  53.0
Korea  1.2  -0.8  0.4  6.1  8.3  14.4
Belgium  21.5  11.1  32.6  92.6  21.3  113.9
Ireland  21.1  19.9  41.0  78.3  51.0  129.3
Italy  32.0  1.1  33.1  74.8  2.0  76.8
Source:  Central  Bank  of  Brazil,  Brazil  Economic  Program;  Banco  de  Mexico,
Indicadores  Economicos;  Norld  Bank,  Indonesia:  Adjustment,  Growth  and
Sustainable  Development,  Report  No.  7222  - IND; IMF,  International
Financial  Statistics  (for  Korea);  OECD,  Economic  Surveys  for  Belgium,
Ireland,  Italy.
Foreign  public  debt  is  net  of  official  foreign  exchange  reserves.
Domestic  debt  is  net  of  money  base. For  Brazil  and  Mexico,  debt  stocks
at  year-end  have  been  deflated  by  the  consumer  price  index  (1980-100)  at
the  end  of  each  respective  year. They  have  then  been  divided  by  real  GDP
in  1980  prices.  Data  for  Italy  are  based  on  new  national  accounts.
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Debt  Determinants
end-1983  to  end-1987
Primary  Real  interest  Real  annual  Share  of  Seignorage
deficit  less  GDP  growth  devaluation,  foreign  in  and  infla-
(-  denotes  debt-weighted  total  debt  tion  tax
surplus)  end  1987
Brazil  0.7  2.3  2.0  0.56  1.8
Mexico  -3.9  9.7  6.6  0.57  1.5
Indonesia  1.2  2.1  18.2  0.99  0.7
Korea  0.9  -0.8  5.1  0.58  0.4
Ireland  1.0  2.5  -5.8  0.39  0.8
Italy  3.2  2.5  n.t.  0.02  1.8
Source:  See  Table  1.
The  primary  deficit  in  Brazil  excludes  interest  payments  for  foreign  public  debt  from
the  operational  public  sector  borrowing  requirement.  In  all  other  cases.  it  excludes
all  interest  payments  from  the  nominal  public  deficit.
Real  interest  is  the  weighted  average  of  the  real  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rate
on  public  debt. For  Brazil  and  Mexico,  only  foreign  interest  have  been  considered.
Real  annual  devaluation  is  based  on  effective  exchange  rates  (geometric  averages
based  on  moving  currency  weights),  adjusted  for  domestic  inflation.
Seignorage  and  inflation  tax  are  defined  as  changes  in  the  inflation-adjusted  money
tax  times  the  annual  rate  of  inflation,  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  in  1980  prices.
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Taxes  and  Domestic  rransfers
as  percentages  of  GDP
1981  1986/87
Taxe  Transfers lt  Jaxes Transfers  Rdt
Brazil  23.6  10.8  12.8  21.8  9.3  12.5
Mexico  (non-oil)  10.6  2.9  7.7  10.5  2.0  9.5
Indonesia  (non-oil) 5.9  2.2  3.7  8.1  1.0  7.1
Korea  18.2  3.1  15.1  18.2  2.9  15.3
Belgium  42.8  45.2
Ireland  38.8  44.3
Italy  32.9  38.9
OECD  average  35.7  36.0
Sources:  W.  Easterly  (1989);  World  Report  No.  /222  - IND  for  Indonesia;  OECD
(1989)  for  OECD  countries.
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Personal  Income  Taxes:  Top  Rates  and  Fiscal  Yield
Maximum  Individual  Tax  Ratesa  Threshold  Fiscal
1980  1987  Income  RevenueC
Ratio  1987b  1980 latest
Argentina  45  (73.7)  45  (62.3)  26  0.0  0.0
Brazil  55  (76.4)  50  (15.6)  7  0.2  0.2
Mexico  55  (65.8)  60  (46.4)  27  2.4  2.0
Indonesia  50  (15.4)  35  (50.0)  86  0.4  0.7
Korea  89  (173.2)  55  (73.0)  25  2.0  2.4
Belgium  n.t.  67  (140.4)  10  14.1  14.3
Ireland  n.t.  58  (22.3)  3  10.9  13.1
Italy  n.t.  62  (462.9)  35  7.5  11.4
Source:  Coopers  and  Lybrand.  1988  International  Tax  Summaries;  IMF,
International  Financial  Statistics
a  Tax  rates  (percentages)  and  associated  taxable  income  (in
thousands  of  US  dollars).  Exchange  rates  used  are  period
averages.
b  Income  tax  at  which  the  top  rate  applies  divided  by  per  capita
GDP.
c  Fiscal  revenues  from  personal  income  tax  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.
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The  Clark  Hypothesis  Revisited
Year  Tax  Ratio  Inflation Multiple  of  Inflation
Highest  Lowest  in .p.a.  Compared  to  Year  When
Tax  Ratio  Peaked
_  _____________  _________  Year  1  Year  2  Year  3
Argentina  1980  23.3  101  1.5  2.4  4.9
1984  18.2  627
1986  22.0  90  1.5 
Brazil  1982  25.1  98  1.7  2.0  2.4
1984  21.8  197
Mexico  1986  21.4  86  1.S  - -
(non-oil)  1983  18.7  102
Chile  1985  43.5  31  0.6  0.6
1981  38.2  20
Columbia  1980  27.3  27  1.0  0.9  0.8
Indonesia  1986  10.1  6  1.5  --
(non-oil)  1984  6.2  10
Korea  1983  19.0  3  0.7  0.7  0.8
1982  18.2  7
Sources: W.  Easterly  (1989);  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics;  World  Bank,
Report  No.  7222-IND.
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Structure  of  Public  Spending
as  percentages  of  GOP
i9F  1,986/87
total  CaDital  Intgrgst Rest  Igini  Capital  Interest  L
Brazil  n.a.  7.6  10.9  8.8  n.a.  5.4  11.3  12.7
Mexico  39.7  12.9  5.0  21.8  44.2  5.5  19.5  19.2
Indonesia  14.6  6.4  0.7  7.3  21.1  8.4  3.3  9.4
Korea  31.0  10.9  1.4  18.5  25.7  9.0  1.3  14.4
Belgium  57.3  5.0  7.9  44.4  54.0  2.8  11.1  40.1
Ireland  46.0  15.2  7.6  23.2  54.4  9.6  11.3  23.5
Italy  43.5  5.9  3.4  34.2  59.5  5.2  8.7  38.6
OECD  avg  39.3  3.5  2.5  33.3  40.2  3.1  3.8  34.3
Source:  See  Table  1. For  OECD  average,  see  OECD  (1989),  ch.  5.
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Capital  Formation,  Private  Savings,  and  Fiscal  Deficits
as percentage  of GDP
Gross  Fixed  Current  Fiscal  Private  Fiscal  Deficit
Capital  Account  Deficit  (-)  Savings  as % of
Formation  Surplus  Private  Savings
1981  1987  1911  1987  19811  1987  1981  1911  1981  1987
Brazil  (nominal)  20.3  19.6  -6.0  0.5  -15.8  -29.5  30.0  49.7  52.5  59.4
(operational)  -6.6  -5.5  20.9  25.7  31.6  21.4
Mexico  (nominal)  25.7  15.3  -5.8  3.1  -13.6  -15.8  33.5  34.2  40.6  46.2
(operational)  -8.8  -1.2  28.7  19.6  30.7  6.1
Indonesia  29.8  26.2  -0.6  -5.2  -1.4  -2.7  30.6  23.8  4.5  11.5
Korea  27.5  30.7  -6.7  8.1  -3.4  -1.3  24.1  40.1  14.0  3.2
Belgium  17.6  15.5  4.2  2.6  -12.2  -10.1  34.1  28.2  35.9  35.7  °
Ireland  29.5  17.4  -37.2  3.0  -15.7  -9.1  8.0  29.5  197.0  30.Y
Italy  23.9  19.9  -2.4  -0.1  -11.4  -11.6  32.9  31.3  34.6  37.0
Source:  See Table  1; IMF;  International  Financial  Statistics
Domestic  private  savings  have  been  calculated  as the residual  of gross  capital  formation  plus  public
borrowing  requirement  plus  current  account  balance.Table  8
Money  Base  and  Domestic  Public  Debt
as  percentages  of  GDP
Real  Money  Base  Real  Money  Base
as  % of  Domestic
Public  Debt
1981  1987  1981  1987
Brazil  3.5  2.2  42  11
Mexico  15.9  4.5  134  11
Indonesia  7.1  8.0  n.t.  n.t.
Korea  5.7  7.4  116  121
Belgium  10.3  7.8  14  11
Ireland  11.0  10.0  19  13
Italy  15.0  15.5  35  21
Source:  Table  1;  TAF,  International  Financial  Statistics
Money  bases  at  year-end  have  been  deflated  by  the  consumer  price  index
(1980  *  100)  at  the  end  of  each  respective  year  and  then  been  divided  by  real  GDP
in  1980  prices.
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Brazil:  Required  public  sector  non-interest  surplus
1983  1984-87  From  1i88
Required  non-interest  surplus
as  oercentaae  of  GDP  C.)  7.5
Real  interest  bill  on
domestic  debt  (W)  i.8  2.3  3.0
Real  interest  bill  on
foreign  debt  (W)  1.5  2.4  1.8
Monetary  finance  (-)  0.1  0.5  0.4
New  domestic  borrowing  consistent
with  constant  debt  ratio  (-)  -0.3  1.0  1.0
New  foreign  borrowing  consistent
with  constant  debt  ratio  (-)  -4.0  1.2  1.3
Memo:  actual  non-interest  balance
(negative  sign  denotes  deficit)  -0.9  -0.4  l.0oa
Assumotions
Ratio  of  money  base  to  GDP  4.4  4.4  4.4
Annual  Inflation  rate  5.0  5.0  5.0
Real  interest  rate  on  domestic  debt
(net  of  taxes)  14.5  14.5  14.5
Obseryationsb
Real  annual  GOP  growth  -2.5  6.3  5.0
Real  annual  devaluation  24.0  2.0  0.0
Real  interest  rate  on  foreign  debt  10.1  8.6  7.0
Source: Central  Bank  of  Brazil.  Brazil  Economic  Program;  Morgan  Guaranty,
World  Financial  MarKets;  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics.
l)  Foreign  public  debt  is  net  of  official  foreign  exchange  reserves.
Domestic  non-monetary  debt  is  net  of  government  assets  and  money
base. Debt  stocks  and  money  base  at  year-end  have  been  deflated  by
the  consumer  price  index  (1980  - 100)  at  the  end  of  each  respective
year. Annual  changes  in  real  debt  and  the  real  money  base  thus
obtained  have  then  been  divided  by  real  GDP  in  1980  prices.
-32-2)  The  operational  public  sector  borrowing  requirement  excludes  the
Monetary  Authority,  and  (pre-Cruzado  Plan)  deducts  the  monetary  and
exchange  correction  paid  on  the  domestic  debt.
3)  The  primary  deficit  excludes  interest  payments  for  foreign  public
debt  from  the  operational  public  sector  borrowing  requirement.
4)  A  decline  in  the  exchange-rate  index  denotes  real  devaluation.
a  Refers  to  January-March  1988
b  Data  from  1988  are  based  on  assumptions.  Real  interest  rate  on  foreign
debt  refers  to  the  effective  rate  net  of  inflation  in  the  US  consumer
price  index.
-33-Table  10
Mexico:  Required  public  sector  non-interest  surplus
1982-83  194l2  87  FrQm  1988
Reauired  non-interest  surplus
as  percentage  of  GOP  (-)  10.6  lO  l  5j1
Real  interest  bill
on  domestic  debt  (+)  1.8  3.2  6.2
Real  interest  bill
on  foreign  debt  (1)  '.9  3.7  3.7
Monetary  finance  (-)  0.3  0.5  1.1
New  domestic  borrowing  consistent
with  constant  debt  ratio  (-)  -0.3  -0.2  1.6
New  foreign  borrowing  consistent
with  constant  debt  ratio  (-)  -6.9  3.4  2.1
Memo: actual  non-interest  balance
(negative  sign  denotes  deficit)  -0.9  4.1  6.9a
Assumptions
Ratio  of  mor.ey  base  to  GDP  12.0  12.0  12.0
Annual  inflation  rate  5.0  5.0  5.0
Real  interest  rate  on  domestic  debt  15.4  15.4  15.4
Observa%ionib
Real  annual  GDP  growth  -2.9  -1.2  4.0
Real  annual  devaluation  31.4  6.6  0.0
Real  interest  rate  on  foreign  debt  9.7  8.5  7.0
Source:  Banco  de  Mexico.  Indicadores  Economicos;  Morgan  Guaranty.  HQLid
Financial  Markets;  IMF.  International  Financial  Statistics;
Dornbusch  (1988).
1)  Foreign  public  debt  is  from  Dornbusch  (1988);  official  foreign
exchange  reserves  have  been  netted  out. Domestic  non-monetary  debt
is  the  sum  of  net  claims  of  the  financial  sector  on  the  central
government  and  non-financial  public  enterprises  p1us  government
bonds  directly  sold  to  the  private  sector  mInus  the  money  base.
Debt  stocks  and  money  base  at  year-end  have  been  deflated  by  the
consumer  price  index  (1980  - .00)  at  the  end  of  each  respective
year. Annual  changes  in  real  debt  and  the  real  money  base  thus
obtained  have  then  been  divided  by  real  GDP  in  1980  prices.
-34-2)  The  operational  public  sector  borrowing  requirement  is  defined  as
financial  deficit  minus  monetary  correction  on  domestic  debt.
3)  The  primary  deficit  is  defined  as  the  financial  deficit  MinIui
interest  payments  on  domestic  and  foreign  public  debt.
4)  A  decline  in  the  exchange-rate  Index  denotes  real  devaluation.
a  Refers  to  April-June  1988.
b  Data  from  1988  are  based  on  assumptions.  Real  interest  rate  on  foreign
debt  refers  to  the  effective  rate  net  of  inflation  in  the  US  consumer
price  index.
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